Warranties Against Infringement in the Sale of Goods: A Comparison of U.C.C. § 2-312(3) and Article 42 of the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods by Schwerha, Joseph J., IV
Michigan Journal of International Law 
Volume 16 Issue 2 
1995 
Warranties Against Infringement in the Sale of Goods: A 
Comparison of U.C.C. § 2-312(3) and Article 42 of the U.N. 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 
Joseph J. Schwerha IV 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil 
 Part of the Commercial Law Commons, Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Contracts 
Commons, and the International Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Joseph J. Schwerha IV, Warranties Against Infringement in the Sale of Goods: A Comparison of U.C.C. § 
2-312(3) and Article 42 of the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 16 MICH. 
J. INT'L L. 441 (1995). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil/vol16/iss2/5 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Journal of International Law at University of 
Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Journal of 
International Law by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more 
information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
WARRANTIES AGAINST INFRINGEMENT IN
THE SALE OF GOODS: A COMPARISON OF
U.C.C. § 2-312(3) AND ARTICLE 42 OF THE
U.N. CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR
THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS
Joseph J. Schwerha IV*
INTRODUCTION
it is Friday afternoon and you are about to call it quits for the day
When a certified letter lands on your desk. You immediately discover it
is from a company (Company X) which you have never heard of. Com-
pany X is demanding that your client stop using an expensive piece of
technical equipment that your client has recently purchased, but has not
yet used. The letter futher states that if your client begins using the
machinery, your client will be in serious jeopardy of being sued for
infringing upon several intellectual property rights belonging to Com-
pany X.
Suddenly, your phone rings. It is your client complaining that he
received the same letter, and he immediately wants your advice about
this problem. You wrote the sales contract which your client used to
purchase the machinery in question. You know that your client has
invested a substantial amount of capital in this new machinery and that
your client cannot afford to leave the machinery idle for more than
another few days, let alone through a lengthy court proceeding. What
are the legal ramifications of using the equipment? Who is responsible
for your client's current predicament? If the machinery does infringe on
someone else's intellectual property rights, does your client have a cause
of action against the company that sold the machinery to your client? If
so, under what theory? What advice do you give your client?
As intellectual property rights become an everyday concern in
commercial transactions, situations similar to the hypothetical above are
occurring more frequently. Gone are the days of simple sales contracts.
Today's corporate lawyers must' have not only a substantial understand-
ing of basic commercial law, but also of the related intellectual property
law. 'Because of the 'shrinking global economy, such knowledge must
rise to an international level.
* J.D., University of Pittsburgh; M.S., Carnegie Mellon University; B.S., Carnegie
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Though there are many issues in the opening example, the most
pressing is the question of warranty against infringement. Generally, a
seller of a good warrants that a buyer will not be sued by a third party
on the basis that the relevant good infringes upon that third party's in-
tellectual property rights.' Though the courts have not yet been inun-
dated with cases arising under this theory, there has recently been a
marked increase in their frequency.2 This trend should be reinforced by
the increase in international transactions and the nature of modem
commercial goods.
The following article compares two provisions: § 2-312(3) of the
Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) and Article 42 of the United Na-
tions Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
(Convention). Each of these sections specifically sets forth a warranty
against infringement in the sale of goods. This article is organized into
three parts, each addressing a major issue involved in invoking the
warranty against infringement under both the U.C.C. and the Conven-
tion. This article culminates with a summary of the major points to
consider when representing a seller or buyer. It provides a substantive
understanding of the warranty against infringement under both the
U.C.C. and the Convention, as well as a framework for deciding when
to use each set of laws for the purposes of invoking this warranty.
U.C.C. § 2-312(3) 3 states that unless the parties agree otherwise,
certain merchants warrant that the goods which they sell will be
delivered free of any rightful claims based upon a third party's in-
tellectual property rights. Simultaneously, buyers warrant that they will
hold sellers harmless from any claims which arise out of the seller's
compliance with the buyer's specifications.
Though this section of the U.C.C. appears fairly straightforward, a
close examination leaves the practitioner with many unanswered ques-
tions. One commentator has gone so far as to state that § 2-312(3)
1. See U.C.C. § 2-312(3) (1990); United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods, opened for signature Apr. 11, 1980, art. 42, S. TREATY Doc. No.
9, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 22-43 (1983), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/18, Annex I (1980), reprinted
in Official Records, U.N. Conference on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 178-90,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/19 (1981) [hereinafter C.I.S.G.].
2. Many of the cases discussed in this article have been brought within the last decade.
3. The complete language of § 2-312(3) is:
Unless otherwise agreed a seller who is a merchant regularly dealing in goods of
the kind warrants that the goods shall be delivered free of the rightful claim of any
third person by way of infringement or the like but a buyer who furnishes
specifications to the seller must hold the seller harmless against any such claim
which arises out of compliance with the specifications.
U.C.C. § 2-312(3) (1990).
[Vol. 16:441
Winter 1995] Warranties Against Infringement in Sale of Goods 443
"provides little more than a broad statement of policy which will have
to be delimited by judicial construction."4 Although § 2-312(3) leaves
several significant gaps unfilled, it does provide some guidance for
interpreting the U.C.C. This article will evaluate § 2-312(3) in more
detail below.
Although the U.C.C. is the usual law in a purely domestic context,
when one enters the international arena the controlling law becomes
much more difficult to ascertain. In order to facilitate international trade,
a treaty was needed to provide a single neutral law that countries could
use in the international sale of goods. Accordingly, the United Nations
Commission for International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) established the
project from which emerged the Convention in 1980.' Though drafted in
1980, the Convention did not come into force until 1988 when the
necessary number of countries had ratified it.6 The Convention consists
of 101 articles which are grouped into four different parts. Unlike the
U.C.C., the Convention specifically sets forth its scope at the outset.7
Article 1 dictates that the Convention will apply to contracts for the sale
of goods between parties residing in different countries where: 1) those
parties' places of business are in countries that have ratified the conven-
tion; or 2) when the rules of private international law lead to the ap-
plication of the law of one of the countries that has ratified the Conven-
tion. 8 Therefore, if two parties reside in the same country, they must
specify in the contract if they want the Convention to apply. There are
4. William F. Dudine, Jr., Warranties Against Infringement Under the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, 36 N.Y. ST. B.J. 214, 218 (1964).
5. See C.I.S.G., supra note 1.
6. See id. art. 99.
7. Article 1 reads:
(1) This Convention applies to contracts of sale of goods between parties whose
places of business are in different States:
(a) when the States are Contracting States; or
(b) when the rules of private international law lead to the application of the
law of a Contracting State.
(2) The fact that the parties have their places of business in different States is to be
disregarded whenever this fact does not appear either from the contract or from any
dealings between, or from information disclosed by, the parties at any time before
or at the conclusion of the contract.
(3) Neither the nationality of the parties nor the civil or commercial character of
the parties or of the contract is to be taken into consideration in determining the
application of the Convention.
C.I.S.G., supra note 1, art. 1.
8. Id.
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pitfalls to applying the Convention,9 but a full discussion of these
shortcomings is outside the scope of this article.
Article 42, located within Part III of the Convention, provides for a
warranty ° against infringement as follows:
(1) The seller must deliver goods which are free from any right or
claim of a third party based on industrial property or other in-
tellectual property, of which at the time of the conclusion of the
contract the seller knew or could not have been unaware, provided
that the right or claim is based on industrial property or other
intellectual property:
(a) under the law of the State where the goods will be resold
or otherwise used, if it was contemplated by the parties at the
time of the conclusion of the contract that the goods would be
resold or otherwise used in that State; or
(b) in any other case,, under the law of the State where the
buyer has his place of business.
(2) The obligation of the seller under the preceding paragraph does
not extend to cases where:
(a) at the time of the conclusion of the contract the buyer
knew or could not have been unaware of the right or claim; or
(b) the right or claim results from the seller's -compliance with
technical drawings, designs, formulae, or other such specifica-
tions furnished by the buyer."
Article 42 must be read in context with Article 4 which states that the
"Convention governs only the formation of the contract of sale and the
rights and obligations of the seller and the buyer arising from such a
contract."' 2 Specifically, Article 4 states that "except as otherwise ex-
pressly provided in this Convention, . . . [the Convention is not con-
cerned with: (1)] the validity of the contract or of any of its provisions
or of any usage; [and (2)] the effect which the contract may have on the
9. See Richard M. Lavers, CISG: To Use, or Not to Use?, 21 INT'L Bus. LAW. 10, 12
(1993) (discussing general areas of question in the application of the Convention).
10. The Convention does not use the word "warranty."
11. C.I.S.G., supra note 1, art. 42.
12. Id. art. 4.
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property in the goods- sold.","3 Finally, it is noteworthy that there is no
case law construing Article 42; therefore, all interpretations of Article 42
must be taken from the language of the provision itself.
At first glance, the above warranties may look simple, but slightly
more study reveals several significant ambiguities within the provisions
themselves. Further, though both the U.C.C. and the Convention provide
for a warranty against infringement, there are advantages and disad-
vantages to using either one. This article provides an in depth analysis
of the major points and concerns in invoking the warranty against
infringement under the U.C.C. and the Convention.
I. THE SCOPES OF THE WARRANTIES
The most important aspect of these warranties is their scope. Al-
though they are substantially similar, there are some very important
differences. This section is separated into three subsections covering: 1)
to whom the warranties apply; 2) at what point they go into effect; and
3) the type of assertions that are covered under the warranties.
A. To Whom does the Warranty Apply Under the U.C.C.?
Depending upon whether one uses the U.C.C. or the Convention, the
warranty against infringement applies to different people. Under the
U.C.C., the seller's warranty against, infringement is conditioned on the
seller being a "merchant regularly dealing in goods of the kind." 14 This
is a significant barrier to the blanket enforcement of the warranty be-
cause it places a substantial burden on the plaintiff to prove that the
seller was not only a merchant, but also that he regularly dealt in goods
of the kind."5
For the purposes of this warranty, the definition of a merchant
regularly dealing in goods' of the kind is unsettled. 16 For example,
classifying a large manufacturing company that usually' produces high-
powered fans to the specifications of their customers, but that has
received an order for a water pump, using the same general type of
mechanism would cause problems under the U.C.C. Since this is the
13. Id.
14. U.C.C. § 2-312(3) (1990). The buyer has no such requirement for his warranty
against claims arising from specifications given to the buyer.
15. The requirement for being a merchant is new to § 2-312. Until § 2-312(3) was added
to § 2-312, there was no merchant-regularly-dealing-in-goods-of-the-kind requirement. The
warranty of title, as set forth in § 2-312(1) and§ 2-312(2), does not include such a require-
ment.
16. See Dudine, supra note 4, at 214.
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first pump the manufacturer constructed, the manufacturer may not be
deemed a merchant regularly dealing with the goods of the kind even
though the manufacturer may be a very sophisticated party.'7
Commentators have discussed various definitions of this problem. In
his article on § 2-312(3), William F. Dudine, Jr. presents the following
argument:
[C]learly, the casual buyer and seller transaction is not within the
scope of this limitation. It is equally clear that a dealer who deals
in a specific type of goods regularly and repeatedly is within the
scope. The parties that lie between these extremes present the
problem."
Sometimes it is profitable to look for definitions elsewhere in the U.C.C.
Section 2-104(1) defines merchant as:
a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his oc-
cupation holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to
the practices or goods involved in the transaction or to whom such
knowledge or skill may be attributed by his employment of an
agent or broker or other intermediary who by his occupation holds
himself out as having such knowledge or skill.' 9
Section 2-312(3) limits merchants to those regularly dealing in goods of
the kind. Indeed, at least one commentator has stated that the § 2-104
definition "was developed to meet traditional sales warranty situations
and may be too broad when applied to infringement situations."20 Al-
phonse M. Squillante and John R. Fonseca, in Williston on Sales, take
this discussion further. They urge that the two definitions of merchant
be taken as the same.2' They also imply that the two definitions should
be taken as the same only to avoid confusion and that "if taken in the
context in which it was offered, merchant, as employed in § 2-312, is
one who sells from his normal stock and in his normal course of busi-
ness."
22
Still others have defined merchant differently. William D. Hawkland
17. Intuitively, one might think that such a sophisticated party should be held to the
warranty, but the drafters of the U.C.C. specified that not all sellers would be held to the
warranty.
18. See Dudine, supra note 4, at 218.
19. U.C.C. § 2-104 (1990).
20. Dudine, supra note 4, at 218.
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adopts the § 2-104 definition, but exempts those merchants who are
deemed as such solely because of their "knowledge or skill peculiar to
the practices or goods involved, or to whom such knowledge or skill
may be attributed. ' 23 Hawkland reasons that the § 2-312(3) "warranty is
made only by merchants who deal in the goods of the kind because they
are the ones who know, or should know, of possible patent or trademark
violations."'24
Thus, defining a merchant regularly dealing in goods of the kind
remains a problem. Recognizing this quandary in borderline cases,
Dudine suggests the following:
[Tjhe underlying basis of the warranty should control. In the case
of the seller two questions should be asked. Is it reasonable to
presume that the seller by reason of the extent of his dealing in the
goods has superior knowledge of the patents relating to the goods?
Secondly, does it comport with the public policy to impose the risk
of this warranty on this seller; would it "preserve flexibility in
commercial transactions and encourage continued expansion of
commercial practices" (sec. 1-102) to apply the warranty against
this particular seller? If these questions can be answered affirma-
tively, the warranty should apply. Otherwise, the rule of caveat
emptor is the better rule.25
Dudine looks first to the extent of the seller's knowledge of the in-
tellectual property involved, and second, to whether imposing liability
on this particular seller would comport with general principles espoused
in U.C.C. § 1-102. Each of these definitions and suggested solutions,
however, leaves something to be desired. If courts or practitioners
assume that merchant is used in § 2-403 the same way and for the same
purposes as it is used in § 2-312(3), then only Hawkland's analysis is
accurate. But, that line of thinking is questionable because § 2-403 does
not include the word "regularly." There is a significant difference
between someone who merely deals in the goods of the kind and some-
one who "regularly" deals in goods of the kind. The latter merchant is
probably more familiar with those goods and presumably also has a
better knowledge of the intellectual property rights involved. Thus, it
appears that the authors of the U.C.C. had a higher level of knowledge
23. 2 WILLIAM D. HAWKLAND, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES § 2-312:04, at 395
(1992). Apparently, Hawkland makes his exemption based upon Comment 2 to § 2-312 which
exempts essentially the same parties as Hawkland analogizing to those merchants "who deal
in the goods of the kind" under 2-403(2).
24. Id.
25. Dudine, supra note 4, at 218.
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in mind for § 2-312 than for § 2-403. This "level of knowledge" ap-
pears to be the key indicator in this murky area. Accordingly,
Hawkland's exemptions are probably unwarranted.
Based on the authorities cited above and an analysis of the U.C.C.,
the following is proposed as a definition of merchants regularly dealing
in goods of the kind for the purposes of § 2-312(3):
A merchant regularly dealing in goods of the kind is one who: (1)
has the item in his normal stock and/or2 6 sells said item in his
normal course of business; or (2) by his general experience or
special knowledge of the goods, through past experience or
otherwise, should be imputed with a comparable or higher level
knowledge of the goods as said person defined in subsection (1).27
This definition, which is essentially a standard followed by an exception
thereto, addresses most of the concerns set forth above while setting a
fairly clear rule to follow. First, a merchant regularly dealing in goods
of kind includes those people who have the goods in their normal stock
or who sell the goods in question in their normal course of business.
Second, the above standard recognizes that there exists some parties that
have enough knowledge or sophistication that it would be unjust to
exclude them from the warranty; therefore, the standard creates an
exception for those parties.
What constitutes "normal" in the proposed definition has to be
determined on a case-by-case basis.. The following example illustrates
this point. Suppose that the owner of a retail book store chain, Buyer A,
decides that he wants to introduce computer programs into the line of
goods which he sells.2" Buyer A decides to call the wholesaler whom he
usually deals with, Seller B, to order the programs. Seller B does not
deal in computer programs, but because Buyer A is such a good cus-
tomer, Seller B makes an exception and arranges the transaction. Un-
knowingly, Seller B buys the computer programs from an unreputable
manufacturer whose products infringe upon a third party's copyright.
Buyer A accepts the goods and is promptly sued by the owner of the
copyright. What'claim does Buyer A have against Seller B? A court
26. The author of this article uses "or" in addition to "and" to make explicit that normal
stock not only includes the items the seller physically possesses, but also any goods that the
merchant sells in his normal course of business. For example, a carpenter who special orders
an air conditioner for a customer may not fall within this definition.
27. This definition combines parts of all of the'theories already mentioned into a novel,
concise standard. It does not represent any single authority's version.
28. For the purposes of this example, the' author has assumed that these programs are
goods.
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could easily read § 2-312(3) to require frequent sales. Thus, if the court
merely questions how frequently B sold those goods, it would probably
not hold him to the warranty because this was the only time he ever
sold this type of good. 29 However, under the standard proposed, Buyer A
would have an enforceable claim against Seller B because of Seller B's
past knowledge from his wholesale business of copyright law and com-
mercial transactions.
B. To Whom does the Warranty Apply Under the Convention?
Under the Convention, there are no qualifications concerning the
type of seller to which the warranty will apply. Article 42 merely states
that "[tilfie seller must deliver goods which are free from any right or
claim of a third party .,3 The Convention does not define seller,
nor are there any cases that give insight into the definition of "seller"
within Article 42. Therefore, it is probable that this warranty will apply
to any seller in a transaction that comes within the Convention.
While the U.C.C. puts a restriction upon the seller to the extent that
he must be a merchant regularly dealing in goods of the kind, the Con-
vention has no such requirement. This is a significant difference because
it creates a large loophole for sellers under the U.C.C. For example,
suppose a Canadian company wants to buy widgets from a U.S. com-
pany that does not qualify as a merchant regularly dealing in goods of
the kind. Under ,the U.C.C., the Canadian company does not have a
warranty against infringement claim against the U.S. company; however,
under the Convention, the Canadian company could bring a valid war-
ranty against infringement action against the U.S. company.
C. The Period of Time that the Warranties Apply
Even if one recognizes that he is in the class of people to which the
warranty applies, one must still know the period of time the warranty
will be in effect. The language of both Article 42 and § 2-312(3) im-
plies that the goods must only be delivered free of a claim. 3' Therefore,
the rights or claims present at the time of delivery are very important.
On the other hand, sometimes goods may be delivered without an actual
claim having been made against such goods even though a third party
29. This assumes that books are not the same "kind" of-goods as computer programs.
30. C.I.S.G., supra note 1, art. 42.
31. What sort of claim is not yet determined. In fact, it is probably the most hotly
contested point about this whole warranty. See discussion infra part I.D.
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has valid grounds to assert a claim.32 The question is what "delivered
free of' should mean in light of this ambiguity. The theory that the
buyer should not be disturbed in his use of the goods relates back to the
general principles of quiet possession. However, the seller should not be
responsible for claims which he could not have foreseen at the time of
sale. This is further supported by principles under finality of contract.33
Based on the above arguments and the lack of relevant case law, the
modern business lawyer should be cautious and interpret "delivered free
of' to mean delivered free from any potentially colorable claims present
at the time of sale, not merely that no actual claim had been asserted.
Those practitioners who advise their clients that the goods must merely
be delivered free of any claims that have actually been asserted may
well later be surprised if a judge were to hold that "delivered free of'
means delivered free of the basis for a claim, not just free from an
actual and present third party claim.
34
After the warranty goes into effect, there is no technical limitation
on how long it stays in effect. The only limitations that control whether
the warranty may be invoked are the respective limitations periods for
actions based upon the warranties, and the question of whether the
claims may be based upon the buyer's use. These last two points,
however, are better suited to be discussed in the next section of this
article.
D. The Types of Assertions that Are Included
Within the Warranties
This is the most complex part of the scope of the respective warran-
ties against infringement. In order to make this section as simple as
32. The problem usually appears when a buyer accepts the goods and then, after the
buyer has used the goods for a while, a third party gives notice that the buyer has been
infringing on that third party's intellectual property rights. It is especially troublesome when
such a claim is based upon intellectual property rights which have only been acquired after
the original sale of the goods.
33. If buyers could sue sellers for third party claims on the basis of rights of which the
seller could not have known, sellers could never be sure whether their efforts satisfied the
warranty.
34. The above definition works to the benefit of both sellers and buyers. Sellers will not
be held to warrant against claims that they could not have foreseen at the time of the contract,
while buyers will be confident that sellers will not be able to avoid the warranty on the basis
that the claim was not made until a date sometime after the contract was formed.
The courts could read § 2-312(3) so as to warrant against only claims that have been
made upon the goods at the time of contract formation, but that reading would be un-
necessarily narrow because unsophisticated buyers depend upon the sellers' expertise in
determining whether the goods are marketable. It would be inequitable for sellers to be able
to avoid providing buyers with a remedy under this warranty on claims which sellers knew
could arise, but of which they simply did not inform the buyer.
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possible, the article separates this issue into four separate parts: 1) the
kind of right or claim which must exist; 2) whose right or claim must be
present; 3) the subject matter upon which the claim or right must be
based upon; and 4) the limitations on such rights or claims.
1. What Constitutes a Right or Claim that will give
rise to a Cause of Action?
Both § 2-312(3) and Article 42 provide a warranty against infringe-
ment if certain conditions are met. These conditions are different under
the U.C.C. and the Convention. Under § 2-312(3), the seller warrants
that the goods will be delivered free of rightful claims for infringement
or the like. However, a controversy has arisen over what sorts of claims
should be considered rightful. Since the drafters of the U.C.C. created
ambiguity when they limited § 2-312(3) to only rightful claims, a seller
may very well try to escape liability by urging that the claim made on
the buyer was not "rightful." It appears obvious that a claim for patent
infringement which is litigated successfully by the patent holder is a
rightful claim; however, anything less than a court order may not con-
stitute a rightful claim.
35
Some authors have commented that there is definitely a point where
the claim becomes so attenuated that it no longer represents the type of
claim against which the seller has warranted.36 James J. White and
Robert S. Summers argue that there are two alternatives available for
determining that point. First, it suggests that a "court might hold a seller
liable for expenses incurred in successfully defending against an inferior
claim only if the seller knew or had reason to know that such a claim
was likely to be asserted. 37 Alternatively, these scholars suggest that "a
court could analogize to the standards used to determine whether title to
real property is marketable, specifically, whether the claim is of such a
substantial nature to subject the buyer to serious litigation. 38
35. On one side, any claim whatsoever, even if it would not have any chance of being
upheld in court, would be a rightful claim. On the other side is the situation where the claim
has been litigated and a court has ruled that the goods infringed upon an already existent
patent. In between are a multitude of situations including where: (1) the claim is made by
letter, but seems to have support in the law; (2) the claim is brought in court, but the buyer
reasonably believes that the third party will be successful; and (3) the complaint is filed
against the buyer, and the buyer successfully defends the action.
The spectrum is easy to discern, but finding where in the spectrum lies the rule is the
difficult task. It does not help that leading commentators and the courts are split on this issue.
36. JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-11, at
363 (2d ed. 1980).
37. Id.
38. Id.
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White and Summers' first alternative brings out one of the catch 22
situations arising from determining whether the claim is "rightful." The
warranty only covers rightful claims. The only definition of "rightful"
which everyone agrees upon is that which has been upheld by a court.
In the real world, however, the buyer cannot let the claim for infringe-
ment go undefended because' the buyer is using those goods in his
business. Provided the buyer goes through the notice procedures in
§ 2-607 and successfully defends against the suit for infringement,
possibly at great expense, the buyer might not have a remedy under
§ 2-312(3) because the court, in essence, determined that the claim was
"unrightful." This scenario could lead to even more litigation for the
buyer.
In his article, Dudine spoke of this series of events and included a
possible solution:
[If after receiving notice the seller undertakes to defend, the
buyer's problems are solved. If seller refuses to defend, the buyer
is faced with a difficult decision. If he fights diligently and wins,
he simply proves that there was no "rightful claim" and thereby
forfeits any claim to his litigation costs. If he loses, then under
section 2-607(5)(a) this precludes seller from denying that the
claim was rightful, but the seller may still refuse to pay on the
grounds that there was no warranty in the first place, e.g., seller
can still argue that he was not a "merchant regularly dealing in the
goods," and thereby subject the buyer to a second action in order
to collect for losses incurred in the first action. To avoid this,
buyer should force the issue in or at least combine the two actions
in one by impleading the seller in the first action."
Dudine's solution is viable, but a better alternative is for courts to adopt
a more reasonable definition of "rightful claim." Several commentators
have offered help on this issue. Though Dudine does not offer it for the
purpose of solving the above quandary, his definition is a good ex-
ample: "A rightful claim is one where the buyer or seller reasonably
believes that a third party's infringement charge would probably be
upheld by the courts." 4°
Hawkland describes a related but slightly different approach: "The
warranty of no infringement is breached if the buyer is reasonably
exposed to the patent or trademark claims of third persons, even though
39. Dudine, supra note 4, at 219.
40. Id.
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his use or quiet enjoyment of the goods is not disturbed.",41 Later in his
article, Hawkland hints at how "reasonably exposed" should be inter-
preted:
A curious statement in comment 4 to the effect that "the buyer's
remedy arises immediately upon receipt of notice of infringement"
should not be read literally but in the context of the broader state-
ment that eviction is not a condition precedent to maintaining an
action for breach of warranty of infringement. Normally, of course,
the buyer will not pursue this remedy inless a third party has
notified him of an alleged infringement, because, in the nature of
things, the buyer usually will be unaware 6f that possibility until so
notified. If he should discover on his own that reasonable grounds
for claim of infringement exist, however, he should be able to
revoke his acceptance or sue for damages even though no claim
has been made by a third party. This viewpoint is consistent with
the general thrust of 2-312(1) ... and with the idea that distur-
bance of quiet possession ("evictioi") is not required as a basis for
an action for warranty against infringement.42
Thus, Hawkland's "reasonably exposed" includes: (1) any claim for
infringement actually made by a third party; and (2) knowledge or
reason to know that a third party has reasonable grounds to bring a suit
for infringement or the like. This notion that no claim should have to
actually be made in order for a "rightful claim" to exist finds support
43
in other commentators and the courts. 44
There are some authorities that go even further towards protecting
the buyer's interests. Under their point of view, the "mere casting of a
shadow" over the buyer's right to enjoy the goods without having to
enter into a lawsuit to defend those rights is sufficient to breach the
warranty against infringement.45 Citing an earlier New Jersey Superior
Court case concerning § 2-312(1) warranty of title, the court in' Yttro
41. 2 HAWKLAND, supra note 23, § 2-312:04, at 395.
42. Id. at 396 (emphasis added).
43. But see Gates Energy Prods. v. Yuasa Battery Co., 599 F. Supp. 368, 375 (D. Colo.
1983) (ruling that "actionable controversy" under the Declaratory Judgment Act, which was
necessary for jurisdiction in the case, was not present when claim had not been made on
buyers goods under § 2-312(3)).
44. See RONALD A. ANDERSON, ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-
312:44 n.9 (3d ed. 1982) ("It is thus not necessary that the buyer show that he has been
prevented from using the goods."); Yttro Corp. v. X-Ray Mktg. Ass'n, 559 A.2d 3, 6 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1989) (quoting Comment 4 of the U.C.C. in ruling that a direct claim
for infringement is not required but "merely one way of establishing the fact of breach")
45. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 36, § 9-11, at 363.
Michigan Journal of International Law
Corp. v. X-Ray Mktg. Ass'n adopted the following standard in a
§ 2-312(3) scenario:
The purchaser of goods warranted as to title has a right to rely on
the fact that he will not be required, at some later time, to enter
into a contest over the validity of his ownership. The mere casting
of a substantial shadow over his title, regardless of the ultimate
outcome, is sufficient to violate a warranty of good title.46
This standard probably goes further than the Hawkland "reasonably
exposed" standard, because the "mere casting of a substantial shadow"
seems to be an easier standard for the buyer to meet. But, the two
standards could be very similar if the courts hold that the buyer will
only be able to claim that a "substantial shadow" was cast if a third
party had reasonable grounds to bring suit.47
In accordance with the reasoning espoused by Hawkland and the
holding in Yttro, an actual claim for infringement should not be
necessary to find that a "rightful claim" exists. If such claim occurs in
the form of a complaint, it should be deemed rightful in all but the most
extraordinary cases. In any other case, § 2-312(3) should not be
breached unless the buyer has reasonable grounds to believe that his
enjoyment of the goods will actually be disturbed. Reasonable grounds
means that the buyer had an objectively supportable belief that a third
party had a claim 4 against his goods.49
a. Does the Warranty Against Infringement Include
. the Buyer's Use of the Goods?
Section 2-312(3) dictates that the goods shall be free of a rightful
claim of a third party. It is unclear whether the warranty encompasses
situations where such claims arise because the buyer used the goods in
a particular manner. Under common law on warranty of title, the seller
passed title with no restrictions on its use,50 but today it is still
46. Yttro, 559 A.2d at 3 (quoting American Container Corp. v. Hanley Trucking, 268
A.2d 313, 318 (N.J. Super Ct. Ch. Div. 1970)).
47. It is more likely that the "mere casting of a substantial shadow" is an easier standard
to meet than a "reasonably exposed" standard, because the so-called shadow may not have to
be firmly grounded in law, whereas it appears that to be "reasonably exposed," the buyer
must believe that a third party has grounds for a lawsuit.
48. Such a claim would have to be based upon infringement or the like.
49. In the cases where the claims arose from the buyer's infringing use of goods that
would not otherwise be infringing, the seller should be exonerated.
50. 2 SQUILLANTE & FONSECA, supra note 21, § 15-15.
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questionable whether the warranty against infringement covers the
buyer's use of the goods. In fact, White and Summers note this is one
of two issues concerning § 2-312(3) which merits attention:
First, the provision only requires that goods "be delivered free" of
infringement claims. It could be argued that this language does not
protect the buyer against claims arising out of his use or resale of
the goods. Although the comments do not help clarify the matter, it
has been suggested that the drafters probably did not intend such a
meaning and that "where the normal, anticipated use of the product
infringes a patent, the buyer is entitled to protection."'"
Though White and Summers state a logical argument in favor of in-
clusion, no courts have held that the buyer's use is encompassed within
the § 2-312(3) warranty.
In Motorola, Inc. v. Varo, Inc. ,52 the defendant Varo filed third-party
complaints against the sellers of photosensitive material used in a
patented process to produce semiconductors.53 The court stated it could
"be readily seen ... [that] Varo does not complain that the chemical..
• itself, violates any part of [Motorola's] patent. The allegation is purely
that Varo was induced to use the [chemical] in a process that violates
the teachings of the [patent] .... 5' The court held:
This sort of allegation, that the buyer was induced by the seller to
purchase the good and then use it to infringe a process patent is
wholly outside the language of § 2.312. The delivery of a good is
warranted to be free of all claims of infringement. There is no
warranty that a buyer's use of the good will be free of all infringe-
ment . . . . This would be a warranty as to conduct, not as to
goods.
55
Further, the court determined that any other interpretation would be
unconstitutional, because recognizing such a warranty would create a
state law cause of action for patent infringement in violation of Con-
gress's monopoly power concerning legislation on patents.56
Recently, a federal court has reaffirmed the Motorola ruling. In
51. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 36, § 9-11, at 364 (quoting the remarks of
Professor Pasley in 1 N.Y. ST. L. REVISION COMM'N, 1955 REPORT 740 (1955)).
52. 656 F. Supp. 716 (N.D. Tex. 1986).
53. Id. at 717.
54. Id. at 718.
55. Id. at 718-19.
56. Id. at 719.
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Chemtron, Inc. v. Aqua Products,57 Chemtron filed a complaint against
Aqua Products (Aqua) alleging that Aqua had infringed upon
Chemtron's patent."8 Chemtron produced a device which dispensed dish
washing detergent in commercial dishwashers. 59 Aqua distributed a
similar device some of the parts for which it regularly bought from
Viking Injector Company (Viking).60 Based on the § 2-312(3) warranty
against infringement, Aqua brought a third party complaint against
Viking.6' Stipulating that the "warranty against infringement serves to
provide assurances that the goods sold to the buyer are not subject to
third party claims," 62 the court condemned Aqua's attempt to assert a
cause of action under § 2-312(3):
This language, however, should not be construed to mean that the
buyer, after receiving a clean title to purchased goods, can sub-
sequently incur a lien or liability on the purchased goods by his
own actions, and then impose such liability on the seller. Accord-
ingly, a buyer, such a Aqua, should not be entitled to purchase
goods from a seller, such a Viking, which are not subject to any
infringement action, use the non-infringing component goods in an
infringing device and incur liability to a third party patentee,
Chemtron, and then turn around and attempt to impose liability on
the original seller of the component parts.63
Analogizing this case to Motorola, the court held that the U.C.C.'s
warranty against infringement should not apply in Aqua's case 64 and that
Aqua's interpretation of § 2-312(3) would likely render it unconstitu-
tional.
Based on Motorola and Chemtron, it is clear that if the buyer uses
noninfringing goods in an infringing manner he will not be entitled to
relief. However, it is ambiguous whether the buyer would be able to
avail himself of § 2-312(3) where the buyer purchases noninfringing
goods which infringe on a third party's intellectual property rights
during their intended use. According to a literal reading of Motorola,
any such situation would not be within § 2-312(3), because the warranty
only applies to goods and not to conduct associated thereto.
57. 830 F. Supp. 314, 315 (E.D. Va. 1993).
58. Id.
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This reading is contrary to common sense, however, because any
party that could take advantage of this warranty will have already ac-
cepted the goods before being notified of any third party claim. In
effect, a literal reading of Motorola concludes that this warranty would
be unavailable after the buyer had accepted the goods. If the drafters
had wanted such a restriction, they could have easily included it within
§ 2-312(3). Although Chemtron took Motorola into account, Chemtron
implied that the buyer's use may be encompassed within § 2-312(3) by
not totally excluding conduct. In other words, it can be argued that
Chemtron took a more reasonable reading of Motorola and would
extend the § 2-312(3) warranty to the buyer's noninfringing use; there-
fore, practitioners and courts faced with this issue should extend the
warranty to the buyer's noninfringing use. But, if the buyer uses
otherwise noninfringing goods in an infringing manner, the buyer should
not be given any remedy under § 2-312(3).
Alternatively, under Article 42 of the Convention, the goods must
be free from "any right or claim."65 This apparently broad language
guards against the buyer's being disturbed in his possession of the goods
by any right or claim of a third party. There appears to be no validity
requirement for such claims, but one should read into this provision that
such claims should be made in good faith. Otherwise, a party could
easily claim breach by convincing someone to make a claim on the
goods even though such claim was meritless and in bad faith.
Further, the obligation warrants against any right or claim. Based
upon the drafters inclusion of this alternate language, it is evident that
no claim has to be made in order for breach to occur. Article 42 is
breached if the seller delivers good in which anyone else merely has a
right. Finally, there is no reference to the buyer's use of the goods in
Article 42 nor is there any relevant case law. Thus, in order to
determine whether the warranty includes the buyer's use, one should
probably analogize to the § 2-312(3) interpretation on the subject.
An explanation for why the Convention allows for the buyer to
invoke the warranty on the basis of either a right or claim could lie in
the ways in which attorney fees are paid. In the common law system,
each party pays his own attorney and it is in rare circumstances that the
judge may order one party to pay the other's attorney fees.66 In contrast,
in most civil law systems, the losing party will usually be ordered to
pay the winning party's attorney fees. The drafters of the Convention
65. C.I.S.G., supra note 1, art. 42.
66. For example, Rule 11 sanctions in federal court. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
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may have intentionally made it easier for the buyer to have a winning
claim under the Convention because few lawsuits would be brought if
prospective claimants were unsure of the validity of their assertions.
Thus, the "rightful claim" designation may well be more important in
the U.C.C.
In summary, under the U.C.C. the seller only warrants against a
rightful claim, as opposed to the Convention where the seller is
obligated to protect against almost any rights or claims. Although the
language is different, the two provisions may well be very similar in the
final analysis. It all depends upon the definition of a rightful claim. If
the courts take a strict view of the U.C.C., the buyer will possess a
broader range of protection under the Convention. If the courts take a
broader view of rightful claim, there probably will not be much of a
difference in the amount of protection available to the buyer under
either the U.C.C. or the Convention.
2. Whose Right or Claim is it?
It is clear from the language of both provisions that the right or
claim must be held or made by a third party.67 Even if one overlooks the
quandaries involved with proving a "rightful" claim under § 2-312(3), it
is unclear whether either provision means that the rights or claims
themselves must be based upon a third party's intellectual property
rights or that such claims must be actually made (i.e., suit filed, letter
sent, etc.) by the third party.
6
Article 42 is a little clearer than § 2-312(3) on this subject. The
Convention provides that the scope of warranty goes to both a right or
claim of a third party.69 This usage of both a right or claim in the lan-
guage of the provision implies that no claim has actually to be made,
but rather that the buyer could correctly invoke the warranty based
solely on the grounds that a third party has a right in the goods in
question. This seems like the best interpretation, because it would avoid
the unfortunate situation where a buyer learns that a third party has a
right in goods but has yet to make an actual claim. Further, adopting
this procedure would encourage commercial transactions because buyers
would know they could invoke the warranty at any time.
Even with this supposed increased latitude in invoking the warranty,
Article 42 imposes another significant restraint which would make it
67. U.C.C. § 2-312(3) (1990); C.I.S.G., supra note 1, art. 42(1).
68. See supra part I.D.1 for a full analysis dealing with the definition of a "rightful
claim."
69. C.I.S.G., supra note 1, art. 42.
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very difficult to invoke the warranty. Not only must the right or claim
belong to a third party, but it must also be one "which at the time of the
conclusion of the contract the seller knew or could not have been un-
aware. 7 ° This phrase in particular modifies and restricts the rights or
claims of third parties. First, the claim or right is limited to those of
which the seller knew or could not have been unaware. This provision
allows two ways in which the seller may be held to have some sort of
knowledge of the transaction, one subjective and the other objective.
The buyer could prove that the seller knew by demonstrating actual
knowledge. On the other hand, the buyer could prove that the seller
could not have been unaware of the right or claim. Second, the require-
ment probably exists because it would be unfair to impose liability on
the seller unless the seller was at fault in some manner. In other words,
the drafters chose not to impose strict liability for such rights or claims,
thereby giving the buyer two methods of proving fault. Third, the
knowledge, either imputed or actual, must be possessed "at the time of
conclusion of the contract." This requirement refers to time and implicit-
ly prohibits bringing a claim based upon the knowledge that seller
obtained or could not have been unaware until after the contract was
concluded.7'
3. The Legal Grounds upon which the Right or
Claim Must be Based
The warranty against infringement is very specialized. Generally, the
transaction must involve goods that could give rise to claims under
intellectual property law. Since neither the U.C.C. nor the Convention
provide any substantive intellectual property rights, the types of rights or
claims covered by the respective provisions must be inferred from their
language.
Under § 2-312(3), these rightful claims are restricted to those arising
from "infringement or the like." The warranty traditionally arose under
claims for infringement of a patent or trademark.72 However, in recent
times, this warranty has been applied in a broader range of claims
70. l1& art. 42(1).
71. This second avenue may provide a reason to keep the copyright notice on
copyrighted goods. See Arthur Fakes, 3 SOFTWARE L.J. 559, 580 (1990). Some other com-
mentators may read the conclusion of the contract to mean after the obligations thereunder
have been completed.
72. For a discussion of pre-U.C.C cases involving warranties against infringement, see
Dudine, supra note 4, at 214.
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including those arising under copyright.73 Theoretically, it could extend
to many types of claims because the drafters used the phrase "or the
like." At least one court has implied that the only requirement for a
claim to fall within § 2-312(3) is that it must comply with the policy
underlying § 2-312(3)."4 The court determined such policy to be "that a
merchant who regularly deals in like goods has a duty to insure that no
claim of infringement by a third party mars the buyer's title . .. .. t7 It is
still unclear how far the phrase "or the like" extends. Commentators
have presented various interpretations. For example, Hawkland sub-
scribes to a broad view:
The warranty stated in section 2-312(3) is broader than patent and
trademark infringement because it applies to such infringements "or
the like." The exact scope of the warranty is not indicated by the
section or its comments, but the language "or the like" suggests
that it is limited to things like patent and trademark protective
arrangements.
76
These related claims may be limited to "other proprietary rights," 77 but
such like claims could possibly be based on anything from copyright
and trade secret to antitrust and possibly unfair competition laws. In his
article, Dudine adds. one more restriction by limiting such claims to
"those rights which are issued and in being at the time of the sale."
78
This theory seems reasonable, but unrelated to the grounds from which
the claim was derived.
Pursuant to Article 42 of the Convention, such a right or claim is
limited to those "based on industrial property or other intellectual
property. ' 79 It is implied that industrial property is included within the
definition of intellectual property by the inclusion of the phrase "or
other." This may have been included because people elsewhere in the
world use "industrial property" to describe certain subject matter that
Americans consider to be encompassed within intellectual property.
However, the exact definition of intellectual property is unclear. Though
no dominant view exists, the most reasonable way of defining what
constitutes "industrial property or other intellectual property" would be
73. Photofile v. Graphicomp Sys., 1992-1994 Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) 27,161 (N.D.
Ill. Sept. 17, 1993) (mem.).
74. Dolori Fabrics v. The Limited, 662 F..Supp. 1347, 1358 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
75. Id.
76. 2 HAWKLAND, supra note 23, § 2-312:04.
77. See Dudine, supra note 4, at 220.
78. Id.
79. C.I.S.G., supra note 1, art. 42.
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to analogize to the U.C.C. definition of intellectual property. This anal-
ogy makes sense, because even though the two provisions use different
language, they are probably meant to encompass similar subject matter.
When someone uses the Convention, it is by definition an interna-
tional transaction; therefore, unlike most transactions involving the
U.C.C., 0 it will not always be clear upon which country's intellectual
property laws that said right or claim must be based. It would also seem
to be unfair to force the seller to have knowledge of the intellectual
property laws of every country in which the goods could be sold, since
the seller does not have control over the goods once they are tendered to
the buyer."' Article 42 states that the right or claims must be based upon
only certain countries' rights.82 Article 42 puts forth two alternatives: 1)
under subsection (a), the right or claim could be based upon the law of
the country where the parties contemplated the goods would be resold or
otherwise used, 3 but only if such was contemplated by the parties;8 4 or
2), in any other case such right or claim must be based upon the law
where the buyer has his place of business.85 This distinction is very
important because the Convention does not include any causes of action
arising from intellectual property infringement.
4. The Buyer's Duties under the Warranty
Against Infringement
Both Article 42 and § 2-312(3) provide limitations on the kinds of
assertions permitted under the respective provisions even if the rest of
the requirements are met. Under the U.C.C., this limitation takes the
form of a sort of "buyer's warranty." Section 2-312(3) places an affir-
80. Although parties in to an international transaction may contractually provide that the
U.C.C. will be the governing commercial law, the vast majority of transactions in which it is
applicable are those in U.S. states, because a version of the U.C.C. is probably the ordinary
governing law. Also, since intellectual property law in the United States is almost exclusively
based in federal law, claims under the U.C.C. almost always invoke federal intellectual
property laws.
81. See GRANT R. ACKERMAN, U.N. CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTER-
NATIONAL SALE OF GOODS ANNOTATED 42-2 (1993).
82. C.I.S.G., supra note 1, art. 42.
83. Id. art. 42(1)(a). This distinction is important, because jurisdiction chosen could be
that of the place where the parties contemplated the goods would be resold or otherwise used,
even if that ends up being a different country from that where the goods were actually sold or
otherwise used.
84. Id. It is important to note that by extending the warranty to rights or claims of the
country where the goods would be resold, Article 42 implicitly recognizes that claims may be
made upon the persons to which the "buyer" sells. This is an expansion of the scope of this
type of warranty which is not permitted under the U.C.C.
85. Id art. 42(l)(b). Article 9 discusses where the buyer has his place of business. Id
art. 9.
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mative duty on the buyer to hold the seller harmless from any claims
which arise from the seller complying with specifications that the buyer
had furnished to the seller.86 This is essentially a new type of warranty
which protects the seller. The exact language of the buyer's warranty
against infringement is as follows: "a buyer who furnishes specifications
to the seller must hold the seller harmless against any such claim which
arises out of compliance with the specifications.""7 Basically, the buyer
warrants that if the buyer furnishes specifications to the seller, the buyer
will hold the seller harmless against any claim that arises out of the
seller's compliance with those specifications.
There are three main points of concern about the buyer's warranty
which remain unclear. First, it is noteworthy that no qualifications have
been put on the buyer to fall within this warranty provision.88 Presumab-
ly, any person who sells a good regardless of education, experience, or
sophistication must hold the seller harmless in these situations. This
seems contrary to common sense.89 Surely the authors of the U.C.C. did
not want an unwary consumer to hold the seller harmless in this situa-
tion. Therefore, one should define a "buyer" as a person: 1) who
regularly deals in the goods in question; or 2) if the circumstances
dictate, a sophisticated buyer who deals in goods similar to those in
question. Buyers who would fall under the first option are those that
regularly deal in their goods and thereby should be held to the buyer's
warranty. The second option is provided to encompass common situa-
tions where a buyer will be very sophisticated, but might be purchasing
a particular good for the first time. Even though these buyers are not
very experienced in buying that particular good, they should be held to
the buyer's warranty because their general sophistication eliminates the
need to protect them. This standard would eliminate the aforementioned
problems because the only buyers that would have to satisfy the buyer's
warranty would be the ones in a position to understand their obliga-
tions.90
86. U.C.C. § 2-312(3) (1990).
87. Id.
88. This is especially relevant, because the only sellers that must provide the § 2-312(3)
warranty are those who are merchants regularly dealing in goods of the kind.
89. U.C.C. § 2-312(3) (1990). For example, Joe Consumer walks in off the street into
Custom Manufacturing Shop A and shows Sally Seller a picture of a machine that Consumer
wants Seller to manufacture for him. Seller builds Consumer the machine which requires
using a process that violates manufacturer B's patent. B promptly sues for infringement
thereof. Consumer is quite unsophisticated and has no knowledge about intellectual property
law. Unsophisticated Consumer should not be held liable because Seller is generally in a
much better position to know of any potential infringement.
90. The buyers in the first option do not have to be sophisticated. Buyers' experiences in
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Second, under § 2-312(3), the definition of "specifications to the
seller" is brutally ambiguous. 9' Comment 3 to § 2-312 states that the
seller's warranty is not effective:
[W]hen the buyer orders goods to be assembled, prepared or
manufactured on his own specifications .... There is, under such
circumstances, a tacit representation on the part of the buyer that the
seller will be safe in manufacturing according to the specifications,
and the buyer is under an obligation in good faith to indemnify him
for any loss suffered. 92
Park-Ohio Industries v. Tucker Induction Sys. 93 is one of the only
cases that explicitly deals with the buyer's warranty against infringe-
ment. The controversy in Park-Ohio commenced when General Motors
(GM) purchased several large induction hardening machines from Park-
Ohio Industries (Park-Ohio).94 When a certain part of these machines
failed, namely the valve seat inductors, GM sent them to Tucker Induc-
tion Systems, Inc. (TIS) for repairs. 95 Park-Ohio promptly sued TIS for
patent infringement arising from TIS' contract to repair the machines.96
TIS impleaded GM, claiming that GM had breached its § 2-312(3)
warranty against infringement.97 The court characterized the situation as
follows:
TIS/Tucker contends that TIS is the seller and GM the buyer for
the purposes of this statute98 and that GM violated § 2-312(3) by
refusing to deal with TIS after TIS/Tucker brought this suit. In
other words, plaintiffs contend GM did not honor its warranty to
regularly dealing in those goods gives the buyers the expertise to be held to the higher
standard. However, note that there is no case law on this issue; therefore, the above defini-
tions are only suggestions to those who may have to define such provision in the future.
91. For example, it would seem just for a sophisticated buyer to be liable for in-
demnification to a small printer who is being sued for infringement of a third party's copyright,
where the buyer had furnished the printer with a book knowing it did not own the copyright.
However, if a buyer asks a seller to manufacture a machine that performs a certain function and
the seller infringes on someone else's patent in manufacturing the machine, the buyer intuitively
does not seem responsible for the violation and thereby should not be held liable under this
warranty.
92. U.C.C. § 2-312(3), cmt. 3 (1990).
93. No. 82-2828, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15642 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 21, 1987).
94. Id at *2.
95. Id. Jerome E. Tucker was also individually named to the suit, but it is unnecessary to
include'him as a party to discuss the court's holding.
96. Id.
97. Id. at *3. GM objected to the application of § 2-312(3), but the court never got to the
merits of this objection. Id.
98. It is apparent that the court is referring to § 2-312(3) from the context of this
particular commentary. Id. at *6.
Michigan Journal of International Law
hold TIS/Tucker harmless because GM refused to send TIS busi-
ness after it filed this claim."
The court disposed of the claims on the basis that the parties had
"agreed otherwise" through a clause in the contract"° indicating that TIS
expressly indemnified GM for any patent infringements.'0 ' However, the
court stated in dictum that "even if TIS/Tucker did not 'agree otherwise'
GM has held TIS/Tucker harmless. GM entered into a settlement with
Park-Ohio wherein Park Ohio [sic] agreed to release TIS/Tucker for
damages arising from the GM contracts."' 2 Further, the court concluded
that GM did not breach § 2-312(3) because it had no duty under the
contract which allowed GM to hire TIS on an discretionary basis. 0 3 Thus,
in this case, the court recognized a very broad definition of specifications
within § 2-312(3). Essentially, the court held that the specifications
furnished by the buyer could include a mere direction to repair a piece of
machinery, with no additional specific instructions.'"
Beyond the case law, at least one commentator has tried to define
"specifications furnished ,to the seller." After considering that the task was
"indeed difficult,' 0 5 Dudine provided the following analysis:
[s]ince this warranty is clearly an exception carved out of the 'caveat
emptor' doctrine, in fact the opposite of the doctrine, it would seem
to accord more reasonably with the underlying purposes of the Code
specified in section 1-102 to apply this half of the warranty provision
most sparingly. The Code' warranty' is not intended to apply in all
sales transactions, that is, the warranty does not have to fall on either
the buyer or the seller. There is a vast middle ground where neither
is liable, the seller not being a merchant regularly dealing in the
goods and the buyer not being one who furnishes specifications.
Therefore, unless it is clear that the buyer actually caused the
infringement by explicitly specifying an infringing formula,
product or process, he should not be liable."°6
99. Id. at *6-7.
100. See infra note 151 and accompanying text for a further discussion of this case.
101. Park-Ohio, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15642, at *7.
102. Id. at *8.
103. Id. In other words, TIS was not damaged because GM was not under any contractual
duty to continue dealing with TIS. id.
104. Id. at *7-8 (failing to mention any specific instructions that were necessary for the
purposes of the § 2-312(3) warranty). The author assumes that since no instructions for repair
were mentioned in the opinion, the court did not rely on any in making its decision.
105. Dudine, supra note 4, at 220.
106. Id. (emphasis added).
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Dudine thinks that the buyer should be liable under his warranty against
infringement only if "it is clear" such specifications "actually caused"
the infringement. Intuitively, this makes a lot of sense and would solve
the problems demonstrated in the examples noted above. However, it
would be imprudent to adopt the "unless it is clear" standard, because if
the buyer's warranty only applies to certain buyers, there would be no
need to meet the "clear" standard. Also, it is unnecessarily narrow to
limit the buyer's warranty solely to situations where the buyer provides
an "infringing formula, product or process."t°7
Finally, the warranty should explicate that the seller should not
know nor have reason to know that complying with such specifications
would infringe upon a third party's intellectual property rights. To allow
the seller to sue on the basis of the buyer's specifications, where the
seller knew or had reason to know that by complying the seller would
or reasonably may infringe upon a. third party's intellectual property
rights, would be rewarding the wrongdoer for his own wrongdoing. At
the very least, the seller should have a good faith duty to inform the
buyer of the possibility of infringement. An equitable definition of
specifications is: any specification furnished by a "buyer" that caused
the seller to act in such a manner as to give rise to a third party's right-
ful claim for infringement or the like, but if and only if the seller at the
time of delivery did not know nor had reason to know that complying
with said specifications of the buyer could give rise to such a claim.
Third, the language of the buyer's warranty is unclear as to what
"hold harmless" means. At least one court has recognized that hold
harmless could require the buyer to indemnify the seller against any
claims by third parties as well as any consequential or exceptional
damages.108 Furthermore, the Official Comment to § 2-312(3) has
characterized the buyer's Warranty as a good faith obligation to in-
demnify the seller for "any loss suffered."' ° 9 Thus, the definition of hold
harmless is murky."0
107. Id
108. Park-Ohio, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15642, at *7; see infra notes 151-52 and
accompanying test; see also supra note 93 and accompanying text.
109. U.C.C. § 2-312,,cmt. 3 (1990). '
110. Hold harmless should be read to not only indemnify against all rightful claims for
infringement or the like, but also to include all other damages normally available for a breach
of contract. For example, a large car manufacturer contracts with a very small plant to make
all the widgets for its cars. At great expense, the small plant retools all of its machines to
make these widgets. Suddenly, the small plant is served with a letter requesting them to stop
making the widgets, because the plant is violating a third party's patent. If the claim is
rightful, the large manufacturer should not only be liable for the cost of the widgets, but also
for all the small plant's other damages arising from the breach.
There are two less significant discrepancies which can be handled summarily. The
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Under the Convention, there is no buyer's warranty, but the Conven-
tion nevertheless addresses this problem. It provides that the seller's
obligations under 42(1) do not "extend to cases where ... the right or
claim results from the seller's compliance with technical drawings,
designs, formulae or other such specifications furnished by the buyer.'
This provision does not put a duty on the buyer, but rather limits the
situations under which he can make a claim under Article 42.
II. THE PROCEDURES NECESSARY TO INVOKE THE WARRANTIES
In order to take advantage of the warranty against infringement, the
buyer or seller must go through a certain procedure, the contents of
which are determined by: 1) whether it is buyer or seller trying to
invoke the warranty; and 2) whether the U.C.C. or the Convention
applies."'
A. Under U.C.C. § 2-312(3)
In order for the buyer to recover on the seller's warranty against
infringement, the buyer must notify the seller in accordance with § 2-
.607. The relevant language of section 2-607 is as follows:
(3) Where a tender has been accepted
(a) the buyer must within a reasonable time after he discovers
or should have discovered any breach notify the seller of
breach or be barred from any remedy; and
(b) if the claim is one for infringement or the like (subsection
(3) of Section 2-312) and the buyer is sued as a result of such
a breach he must so notify the seller within a reasonable time
after he receives notice of the litigation or be barred from any
remedy over for liability established by the litigation.
(4) The burden is on the buyer to establish any breach with respect
to the goods accepted.
(5) Where the buyer is sued for breach of a warranty or other
obligation for which his seller is answerable over
(a) he may give his seller written notice of the litigation. If the
buyer's warranty is effective against "any such claim." It would be reasonable to assume that
"any such" refers to claims for infringement or the like. In the buyer's warranty, it is also
stated that the claims must arise out of compliance with the specifications. What "arises out
of compliance" means is somewhat unclear. The phrase probably should be interpreted to
mean all commercial actions necessary to meet the specifications.
111. C.I.S.G., supra note 1, art. 42(2).
112. Generally, notice must normally be given to the party making the warranty in order
to take advantage of it under both provisions.
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notice states that the seller may come in and defend and that if
the seller does not do so he will be bound in any action
against him by his buyer by any determination of fact common
to the two litigations, then unless the seller after seasonable
receipt of the notice does come in and defend he is so bound.
(b) if the claim is one for infringement or the like (subsection
(3) of Section 2-312) the original seller may demand in writing
that his buyer turn over to him control of the litigation includ-
ing settlement or else be barred from any remedy over and if
he also agrees to bear all expense and to satisfy any adverse
judgment, then unless the buyer after seasonable receipt of the
demand does turn over control the buyer is so barred.
(6) The provisions of sections (3), (4) and (5) apply to any obliga-
tion of a buyer to hold the seller harmless against infringement or
the like (subsection (3) of Section 2-312).'
Shortly stated and oversimplified, the comments to § 2-607 note that
"[s]ubsections (3)(b) and (5)(b) give a warrantor against infringement an
opportunity to defend or compromise third-party claims or be relieved of
his liability . . . . Subsection (6) makes these provisions applicable to
the buyer's liability for infringement under Section 2-312."l 4 A
thorough analysis leads to the conclusion that the above quoted language
gives rise to more complex requirements.
Section 2-607(3) establishes when a buyer must notify the seller in
the event of breach regardless of whether a direct claim has in fact been
made. If the buyer discovers the breach, by being named as a defendant
in a suit or otherwise, he must notify the seller within a reasonable time
or be barred from any remedy. This § 2-607(3)(a) breach could occur by
any means that would fall within a "rightful claim" under § 2-312(3). In
the case of § 2-312(3), § 2-607(3)(b) specifically establishes that failure
to notify the seller within a reasonable time after the buyer received
notice of the litigation will result in the buyer being barred from
recovering any remedy from "liability established by the litigation.","
Section 2-607(5)(b) provides notice procedure in the event that the
buyer is actually sued. Under § 2-607(5)(b), the seller must complete
two tasks. First, the original seller must demand in writing a letter
stating that the buyer must assign the litigation to him, including the
right to undertake settlement negotiations, or else the buyer will be
113. U.C.C. § 2-607 (1990).
114. U.C.C. § 2-607, cmt. 7 (1990).
115. U.C.C. § 2-607(3)(b) (1990).
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precluded from seeking a remedy." 6 Second, if the seller agrees to bear
both the expense of the litigation and to satisfy any adverse judgments,
the U.C.C. dictates that the buyer be barred from remedy against the
seller if he does not assign the litigation to the seller. 117 Furthermore,
§ 2-607(6) creates a converse to the previous rules, applying those rules
to the buyer's warranty."' The strict adherence to the above procedures
is highly recommended, since it is painfully obvious that divergence
presents a distinct possibility of harsh consequences.
B. Under Article 43 of the Convention
Under the Convention, the buyer must notify the seller of such
claims pursuant to the requirements set forth in Article 43:
(1)The buyer loses the right to rely on the provisions of article 41
or article 42 if he does not give notice to the seller specifying the
nature of the right or claim of the third party within a reasonable
time after he has become aware or ought to have become aware of
the right or claim.
(2)The seller is not entitled to rely on the provisions of the
proceeding paragraph if he knew of the right or claim of the third
party and the nature of it." 9
There are several points deserving of commentary within Article 43.
First, the buyer must generally give notice of the right or claim to the
seller in order to rely upon Article 42.120 Second, such notice must
specify the "nature" of the claim.'2 ' Exactly what, specificity fulfills this
requirement is murky, but it would probably be satisfied if said notice
included: the parties making the claim, the grounds for the claim (i.e.
claim for infringement of copyright, etc.), and the goods against which
the claim is made. Third, such notice must be given within a reasonable
time after such claim was made. 22 What reasonable time may mean will
be different depending on the countries involved. Because of this,
reasonable time should be determined by the facts and circumstances of
116. U.C.C § 2-607(5)(b) (1990).
117. Id.
118. See U.C.C. § 2-607(6) (1990).





Winter 1995] Warranties Against Infringement in Sale of Goods 469
each case in light of the relevant countries' legal systems.' Fourth,
such "reasonable time" must be judged from the point in time where the
buyer became aware of such right or claim, or where he "ought" to have
become so aware. 24 Though proving it may not be easy, the point where
the buyer became aware is self-explanatory; however, where the buyer
"ought" to have become aware could be quandaiy. A notable contribu-
tion to this confusion is the drafters' failure to use the "could not have
been unaware" standard. It is this author's contention that the drafter's
may have used "ought" to signal that it would depend upon the buyer's
actions. Thus, if the buyer, through reasonable diligence or the like,
should have become aware of the claim at point in time "A," then the
court will judge whether notice was given within a reasonable time from
"A." Again, however, the standard such as "reasonable diligence or the
like" would have to be determined by the facts and circumstances of
each case in light of the legal requirements of the country whose law
applies. Fifth, Article 42 provides an exception to Article 43 to the
extent that the seller shall not rely on Aticle 43(1) when the seller had
actual knowledge of both the right or claim of the third party and its
nature. 125 Noticeably omitted from Article 43(2) is the "reason to know"
standard. 26 Therefore, the seller cannot be exonerated from liability
under Article 42 solely because of the buyer's failure to fulfill his notice
obligations required by Article 43. Finally, it is uncertain when exactly
the seller must obtain his knowledge for the purposes of Article 43(2).127
For the sake of consistency, such knowledge should probably be
measured at the conclusion of the. contract. 28
Both the U.C.C. and the Convention provide that the buyer must
notify the seller within a reasonable time after he receives notice of the
litigation or be barred from recovery under the warranty against infr-
ingement; however, the similarities end there. Under the U.C.C., if the
seller notifies the buyer in writing that he will pay all costs and satisfy
all adverse judgments against the buyer; the buyer will lose any remedy
under the warranty against infringement if the buyer does not assign all
123. Note that if the goods were sold in different countries, and it was contemplated as
such, the applicable law, for the purposes of notice, would be the law under which the claims
were made or rights arose.
124. C.I.S.G., supra note 1, art. 43.
125. Id arts. 42 & 43(1).
126. Id. art. 43(2).
127. Id
128. Though the author would define conclusion of the contract for this purpose as when
the goods were tendered, an installment contract brings up problems which are not discussed
for purposes of economy.
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control of the defense to the seller.'29 Depending upon the situation, this
mandatory assignment of control could either be to the buyer's benefit or
detriment. It could be good for the buyer, because he will be absolved
from costs from the litigation including any possible adverse judgment;
however, it could be troublesome to the buyer where his lack of control
over the litigation translates into an inconvenience in running the business.
The Convention, on the other hand, has several provisions which are
absent from the U.C.C. First, if the seller knew of the right or claim and
the nature of it, he can never deny his obligation under Article 42 on the
basis that the buyer did not fulfill his notice obligations. 30 Second, Article
43(1) includes a provision which puts a duty on the buyer to notify the
seller not only from the time where the buyer has actual knowledge of the
right or claim, but also from when the buyer "ought to have become
aware" of it.' As previously discussed, this imposes a sort of implied
duty on the buyer to be reasonably aware of any possible claims that could
arise. Depending upon how this standard is defined by the courts, it could
provide a potential loophole for the sellers to deny their obligation under
Article 42. Third, under Articles 44 and 50, the buyer may unilaterally
reduce the price owed to the seller if the goods tendered were noncon-
forming.'32 Such reduction in price must be based upon the difference
between the value of the goods as tendered and their value had they
conformed. This unilateral decision can be made even though the notice
provisions of Article 43 were not fulfilled.
33
III. EXCLUDING THE WARRANTY
The U.C.C. and the Convention both provide methods to escape this
warranty including disclaimers and defenses. In almost all cases, however,
the means to the ends are very different.
A. Disclaimers
At the beginning of § 2-312(3) lies evidence of the primary disclaimer
method. This section begins with the phrase "[u]nless otherwise agreed;"'
1
therefore, anyone who wishes to avoid this warranty may just "agree" that
the warranty will not apply. Precisely how these parties to the contract are
129. U.C.C. § 2-607(5)(b) (1990).
130. C.I.S.G., supra note 1, art. 42.
131. Id. art. 43(1).
132. Id. arts. 44 & 50.
133. Id.
134. U.C.C. § 2-312(3) (1990).
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to agree on a disclaimer is still a mystery. There is no express disclaimer
provision for § 2-312(3). To the extent it does not have to be expressly
included in the contract, § 2-312(3) is an implied warranty. 135 But, it does
not fall within the implied warranties which can be disclaimed under
§ 2-316136 because § 2-312(3) is not mentioned anywhere in that section.
If the drafters wanted to include warranties against infringement within
the gambit of § 2-316, they could have easily added such a phrase to §
2-316. This notion that the § 2-312(3) warranty does not fall under § 2-
316 is further supported by Article 2A, dealing with leases, wherein the
drafters of the U.C.C. specifically included a provision that encompassed
warranties against infringement:
To exclude or modify a warranty against interference or against
infringement (Section 2A-2 11) or any part of it, the language must
be specific, be by a writing, and be conspicuous, unless the cir-
cumstances, including course of performance, course of dealing, or
usage of trade, give the lessee reason to know that the goods are
being leases subject to a claim or interest of any person.' 37
Nothing similar to the above quotation appears in Article 2. There is a
disclaimer provision within § 2-312,13' but it is unclear whether it applies
to § 2-312(3), since § 2-312(3) was added after § 2-312(2). Also,
§ 2-312(2) limits itself to modifying subsection one. White, Summers, and
others believe that § 2-312(2) applies to § 2-312(3) as well as
§ 2-312(1). 139 If one adopts this view, a disclaimer may be made through
§ 2-312(2) which states:
[A] warranty under subsection (1) will be excluded or modified only
by specific language or by circumstances which give the buyer
reason to know that the person selling does not claim title in himself
or that he is purporting to sell only such right or title as he or a third
person may have."
135. See D. Klein & Son v. Giant Umbrella Co., 179 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 34 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)
(presuming middleman may be protected by implied § 2-312(3) warranty); see also WHITE &
SUMMERS, supra note 36, at 363.
136. Further, a review of the relevant portion of the Official Comments to § 2-316 tends
to refute the notion that the section applies to the buyer's warranty. Comment 9 explicitly states
that "the situation in which the buyer gives precise and complete specifications to the seller is
not explicitly covered in this section...." U.C.C. § 2-316, cmt. 9 (1990).
137. U.C.C. § 2A-214 (1990).
138. U.C.C. § 2-312(2) (1990).
139. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 36, at 363; see also 2 SQUILLANTE & FONSECA, supra
note 21, § 16-5(5).
140. U.C.C. § 2-312(2) (1990).
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Regardless of whether § 2-312(2) specifically applies to § 2-312(3), the
warranty against infringement can only be disclaimed in one of two ways:
(1) by specific language in the contract, 141 or (2) by the circumstances
surrounding the transaction.
142
Two cases hold that § 2-312(3) can be disclaimed by specific language
in the contract. In MAS Corp. v. Thompson, 43 the owner of a motel, MAS
Corporation (MAS), was stripped of its Holiday Inns franchise and was
forced to change the motel's signs. 144 MAS contracted with Thompson to
make two signs for the motel. 45 The contract, which was drafted by
Thompson, contained the following sentence: "It is understood that
sections of the above described sign will be from former sign, used so as
not to infringe on [the] Holiday Inns trademark.' 46 Almost as soon as the
signs were installed, Holiday Inns, Inc. sued MAS for a violation of its
trademark. MAS then filed suit against Thompson for the alleged
trademark violation. 147 On appeal, one of the MAS's arguments was that
its motion for directed verdict should have been granted at trial, because
Thompson had an alleged duty to deliver the signs free of infringement
under § 2-312(3).14' The court denied this argument, ruling that:
it is clear that [§ 2-312(3)] does not apply in this case. Thompson's
evidence tends to show that the parties agreed [that MAS] would be
liable for any infringement. Even if it was unclear what, precisely,
was "otherwise agreed," the statute only applies if nothing was said
as to liability, and the other conditions are fulfilled. In this situation,
where the parties thought they had agreed to something, what their
agreement actually was is a question of fact for the jury.
14 9
Thus, MAS Corp. recognizes that the parties may disclaim the warranty
against infringement by simply agreeing otherwise in the contract and
that such an agreement does not necessarily have to be clear so long as
it is apparent that some other agreement was formed. MAS Corp. also
supports the notion that § 2-312(3) can be avoided by the circumstances
of the situation, since the court significantly relied upon the parties'
141. MAS Corp. v. Thompson, 302 S.E.2d 271 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983); Park-Ohio Indus. v.
Tucker Induction Sys., No. 82-2828, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15642 (E.D. Mich. Oct 21, 1987).
142. 2 SQUILLANTE & FONSECA, supra note 21, § 16-5(5).
143. 302 S.E.2d 271 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983).
144. Id. at 272.
145. Id. at 272.
146. Id. at 273.
147. Id.
148. ld.
149. Id. at 275.
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description of the circumstances of the case in making its ruling.15°
A few years after MAS Corp., Park-Ohio5' was decided. In Park-
Ohio, the repair contract contained the following clause:
Patents: By accepting this order, seller agrees to defend and save
harmless Buyer, its successors and customers against all suits and
from all damages and claims for actual or alleged infringement of,
or inducement to infringe, any domestic or foreign patent by reason
of the manufacture, use or sale of the material, ordered, including
infringement which may arise out of compliance with specifications
furnished by Buyer. 152  , . 7
Though GM argued § 2-312(3) was generally inapplicable, the court
held that "resolution of the applicability of the statute is unnecessary;
assuming the provision applies, TIS/Tucker has failed to demonstrate
that GM violated the statute.' '153 Applying this rationale, the court found
that the parties did otherwise agree "by expressly covenanting to in-
demnify GM for any patent infringements.' 5 4 From studying the clause,
it is apparent that the court upheld a rather standard contractual clause.
Thus, although the patents clause in Park-Ohio was a little more formal-
ly written than in MAS Corp., the courts are still not applying a very
strict standard to avoid § 2-312(3). For example, the courts could
require that the parties explicitly mention the words "rightful claim of a
third person by way of infringement or the like." Today, the only ap-
parent legal requirement which must be fulfilled in order to avoid the
warranty is that the party trying to avoid the warranty must demonstrate,
through the circumstances or by language of the contract, that some sort
of other agreement exists, even if the exact terms of that agreement are
ill-defined.
The same sort of reasoning applies to disclaimer of the warranty
against infringement under Article 42 of the Convention. As with
§ 2-312(3), the parties may agree to exclude the warranty. Though there
is no express disclaimer provision in the Convention, Article 6 of the
Convention expressly allows contracting parties to agree that the
150. More support for this "circumstances" approach can be found in the dissent in Jones
v. Linebaugh, 191 N.W.2d 142, 145 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971) (Quinn, P.J., dissenting) (stating
that circumstances could give rise to effective disclaimer).
151. Park-Ohio Indus. v. Tucker Induction Sys., No. 82-2828, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15642 (E.D. Mich. Oct 21, 1987). Park-Ohio was the case in which GM sent parts to be
repaired. The repairer, TIS, was sued for patent infringement, so TIS impleaded GM on the
basis of a breach of § 2-312(3). See supra notes 93-104 and accompanying text.
152. Park-Ohio, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15642, at *7.
153. Id.
154. Id. at *8.
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relevant agreement will not include a warranty against infringement. 55
Article 6 provides that "[t]he parties may exclude the application of this
Convention or, subject to Article 12, derogate from or vary the effect of
any of its provisions.' 56 Article 12 of the Convention further informs
this analysis in that it allows certain countries to dictate that a "contract
of sale or its modification or termination by agreement or any offer,
acceptance or other indication of intention to be made in any form other
than in writing does not apply"' 57 where 1) one of the parties has his
place of business in a contracting state; and 2) that party had formally
availed themselves of the option under Article 96.158 But, even if a party
satisfies the above conditions, parties may still be able to avoid the
warranty without having a written agreement if the applicable domestic
law permits avoidance. Thus, if the parties agree in writing that the
warranty against infringement will not apply, ceteris paribus, the war-
ranty will probably not be effective. If the parties agree in some form
other than in writing, however, the warranty may or may not apply,
depending upon: 1) the method by which the parties had agreed; 2)
whether either of the contracting parties had made a declaration under
Article 96 of the Convention; and 3) the applicable domestic law.
59
B. Defenses
Though parties may agree that the warranty does not apply, some-
times both parties will not be in agreement on the subject. In those
cases, the person seeking to avoid the warranty against infringement will
155. C.I.S.G., supra note 1, art. 6.
156. Id.
157. Id. art. 12 (emphasis added).
158. Id.
159. Although the buyer's warranty may be waived both through the circumstances
surrounding the contract and by the language of the contract itself, buyers who put the
disclaimer in the language of the contract are naturally in a better position. Toward that end,
it is suggested that those buyers who wish to disclaim the buyer's warranty put the following
clause in their contracts of sale:
Buyer and seller hereby AGREE that seller waives any and all claims, rights,
and causes of action it may, now or in the future, have against buyer arising out of
compliance with any specifications buyer furnishes to the seller. To wit, seller
hereby waives and relinquishes any claim, right, or cause of action it may have
against buyer deriving from buyer's duty, under statute or otherwise, to hold the
seller harmless against claims for infringement or the like which arise out of
compliance with said specifications.
The above clause should convincingly disclaim the buyer's warranty because it clearly
establishes that: 1) the parties have explicitly agreed to exclude the buyer's warranty; and 2)
the seller has waived any right it may have against buyer arising from specifications furnished
to the seller by the buyer. Any buyer who puts the above clause in a sales contract should be
confident that he has excluded the buyer's warranty from the contract.
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have to provide a valid defense. Though one may also defend on the
basis that the suit was not filed within the requisite time period, the
easiest defenses to identify are those contained in the face of the
provision.' 6° The language of § 2-312(3) is structured so that the warran-
160. U.C.C. § 2-312(3) (1990). Normally, when a seller delivers goods which do not
conform to the contract, the seller has a right to cure the nonconformity subject to a few
conditions. In claims arising under the warranty against infringement, the right to cure could
be slightly more difficult to ascertain, since the buyer will not likely learn that § 2-312(3) was
breached until after he gets notice from a third party that the goods are infringing. Presumab-
ly, this will occur long after the goods were originally tendered.
Yttro interpreted this exact question. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text; see
also supra note 151 and accompanying text. In Yttro, the Yttro Corp. brought suit for breach
of contract against X-ray Marketing Association, Inc. (XMA) based upon XMA's failure to
accept the goods and fulfill its other contractual duties. Yttro, 559 A.2d at 4. XMA defended
on the basis of patent infringement. kL
There is some question as to whether the goods were originally rejected solely on the
basis of patent infringement, but that was the defense raised. Id Yttro Corp. produced certain
x-ray filters that would reduce a patient's exposure to radiation when x-ray pictures are taken.
Id. at 3. Under the contract, XMA was supposed to purchase and market a certain number of
Yttro Corp's filters each year for three years. Though XMA ordered 1,000 filters in the first
year of the contract, it refused to accept 738 of them and later wrote Yttro Corp. to repudiate
the contract for a number of reasons, none of which included patent infringement. Id. Soon
thereafter, Yttro Corp. commenced the lawsuit. Id.
In Yttro, the court ruled upon points relevant to the statute of limitations. The main issue
on appeal was whether Yttro Corp. had the right to cure the defects in the goods. Id. In the
first year of the three year contract, XMA accepted some of the filters, rejected others, and
essentially repudiated the contract before the time for delivery of the rest of the installments.
I& The court rejected the lower court's ruling in favor of XMA because that court had not
followed the Ramirez analysis concerning the seller's delivery of nonconforming goods:
The court there held that the UCC's remedies replaced "recission," and that a buyer
may reject non-conforming goods ... without necessarily having a right to cancel
the contract. Before acceptance a buyer may reject the goods for nonconformity
.... If the rejection occurs within the time set for delivery, the seller's right to
cure is unconditional until that time occurs .... If rejection occurs after the time
set for delivery, the seller has a further reasonable time to cure if the seller
reasonably believes that the goods would be acceptable with or without a money
allowance .... After acceptance the buyer may revoke acceptance only if the non-
conformity substantially impairs the value of the goods.
Id. at 6 (citations ommitted).
The court found that XMA never argued that the defect in the goods substantially
impaired their value and that even if the value was substantially impaired, Yttro Corp. still
had a reasonable time to cure under the Ramirez standard. Id. The court concluded by holding
that Yttro Corp. was entitled to a hearing to interpret its right to cure according to the
Ramirez analysis, and that "[r]especting goods actually delivered in violation of the warranty
against infringement, the reasonableness of Yttro's cure must be judged in light of the
absence of loss, risk or inconvenience to XMA." Id at 8.
This ruling establishes a definite procedure for right to cure cases. It adopts the
framework of § 2-508. If the goods are rejected before the time set for delivery as established
by the contract, the seller has the unconditional right to cure if the seller can do so before that
time. On the other hand, if rejection occurs after time for delivery, the seller may have further
reasonable time to cure provided that: (1) the seller reasonably believed that the goods would
be acceptable with or without money allowance; and (2) the requested cure does not subject
the buyer to any loss, risk, or inconvenience. Because Yttro is the only decision on this topic
and its standard conforms with the procedure established under the U.C.C., this author
endorses the standard for future courts to follow.
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ty only applies if certain conditions are met. In order for the seller of
goods to be required to provide the warranty, the following conditions
must be met: 1) that seller must be a merchant regularly dealing in
goods of the kind; 2) the transaction must be in terms of goods; 3) the
claim made on the goods must be rightful; 4) the claim must be that of
a third person; and 5) such rightful claim must be by way of infringe-
ment or the like.' 6' In addition, § 2-312(3) provides two more limita-
tions: 1) the goods must only be delivered free of such rightful claim;
and 2) the rightful claim must not arise out of specifications furnished to
the seller by the buyer. 62 A violation of any of the above conditions or
limitations will probably be held to be a valid defense against a buyer's
§ 2-312(3) claim. One should note, however, that although these
defenses are identifiable, proving them could be tricky. For instance, it
is plain from the language of the provision that actions may only be
brought on the basis of righiful claims. But, the U.C.C. does not define
what constitutes a "rightful" claim.
163
Similar reasoning applies to Article 42 of the Convention. Besides
proving that the parties "agreed otherwise," the party trying to avoid the
warranty may make several defenses. Some of the defenses are stated in
Article 42. Article 42(2) includes two situations where the seller will be
relieved of his obligations under subsection (1).164 First, the seller is
absolved from responsibility where the buyer "knew or could not have
been unaware" of the right or claim.' 65 But such exception ceases to
exist the moment after the contract is concluded. Presumably, the same
standard of "knew or could not have been unaware" Would apply to the
buyer as applied to the seller in subsection (1). Second, the seller's
obligation also does not extend to situations where such right or claim
"results from" the seller's "compliance" with certain specifications. 166
The Article gives a noninclusive list of examples of such specifications
as being "technical drawings, designs, [and] formulae."' 67 Thus, it
appears that where the right or claim results not from the seller's mis-
givings, but from situations where the buyer had asked the seller for
something in accordance with his specifications, the seller will be ab-
solved from all responsibility for breach of the Article 42 obligation.
161. U.C.C. § 2-312(3) (1990).
162. Id.
163. See supra notes 35-49 and accompanying text as to the definition of "rightful
claim."
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However, it is still unclear what sorts of claims or rights would occur
solely on the basis of the seller's "compliance."'
6
The rest of the major defenses arise from Article 42(1). Article
42(1) provides several conditions that must be fulfilled before the war-
ranty will go into effect: 1) the right or claim must arise under the
applicable law; 2) the seller must have known or could not have been
aware of such a right or claim; 3) the transaction must be for goods; and
4) such right or claim must be based in industrial property or some
other sort of intellectual property.' 69
Sometimes a party seeking to invoke the. warranty will be precluded
from doing so because such claim will have been made at a time
beyond the statute of limitations. Usually the statute of limitations is
simply derived from the general law of the relevant jurisdiction.
However, determining the statute of limitations in a § 2-312(3) action is
potentially problematic. One can easily imagine a situation where the
holder of intellectual property rights does not discover the possible
infringement until a few years after the original sale. This waiting period
could be longer than the relevant statute of limitations. If the statute
were to start to run when the goods were tendered, a number of claims
may be precluded on this basis. Alternatively, if the statute were to start
to run when the buyer discovers the breach, by being named as a
defendant in a suit or otherwise, very few suits, if any, would be
precluded by a statute of limitations defense. Under § 2-725, "an action
for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within four
years after the cause of action has accrued."' 7 ° The cause of action
accrues when the breach occurs, regardless of whether the aggrieved
party has any knowledge of such a breach.171 Such breach occurs when
the goods are tendered. But, where a "warranty explicitly extends to
future performance of the goods and discovery of the breach must await
the time of such performance[,] the cause of action accrues when the
breach is or should have been discovered. 172 Though the language of
168. Id. There are the easy cases where the buyer furnishes the blueprints for a machine
which the buyer does not possess the patent for and the seller has no idea that the buyer does
not own the patent. Equally clear are the cases where the buyer specificies a machine, and the
seller then provides that machine knowing that someone else holds the patent for it and that
he has no license to sell it. It is the situations in between. these two different scenarios that
present the problems.
169. Id. art. 41(1).
170. U.C.C. § 2-725(1) (1990). This subsection also allows the parties to provide that the
statute be reduced down to a period of not less than one year and prohibits the parties from
extending the statute beyond four years.
171. U.C.C. § 2-725(2) (1990).
172. Id.
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§ 2-312(3) only states that the goods must be delivered free of a rightful
claim, as this article earlier stipulated, "delivered free" may reasonably
be taken to mean delivered free from the reasonable basis of such a
claim.7 3 Since the buyer would normally only receive notice of this
rightful claim later, it appears that a § 2-312(3) warranty extends to
future performance. In other words, the seller may not only warrant that
the goods be delivered free of any rightful claim, but also that no right-
ful claims may later be brought that could have been brought at the time
the goods were tendered.
Motorola directly considered this question. 174 Citing § 2-725, one of
the third party defendants raised a statute of limitations defense.'75 After
establishing that the third party complaint was filed after the statute
would have normally run, and that the third-party defendants' had given
Varo no warranty beyond that contained in § 2-312(3), the court held
the following:
Varo would like for an implied extended warranty to be found in
their favor. The [highest state court] ... concluded that the words
of the statute mean what they say. Warranties as to future perfor-
mance must be explicit. Therefore, the [third-party defendant's]
Motion for Summary Judgment based on statute of limitations shall
be granted.'76
Thus, the court refused to interpret the § 2-312(3) warranty as one
which requires future performance."7 Additionally, the court imposed
the new requirement that any warranties as to future performance must
be "explicit." Taken together, these two requirements substantially limit
the operation of the warranty against infringement because so many
suits for infringement may fall outside the statute of limitations.7 '
Yttro is the only other case that considers when the statute of limita-
tions begins to run in a § 2-312 action.'79 The court made two holdings
173. See supra notes 39-49 and accompanying text.
174. 656 F. Supp. 716 (N.D. Tex. 1986); see supra notes 52-56 and accompanying text.
Motorola was the case where a patent owner brought an action against an alleged infringer,
who in turn brought a third party complaint against the sellers of certain material used in a
patented process to make electrical equipment. Motorola, 656 F. Supp. at 718. The third party
plaintiff's (Varo) second cause of action was for breach of the warranty against infringement.
Id.
175. 656 F Supp. at 718.
176. Id. (court interpreting § 2-725).
177. Id.
178. The court passed up the opportunity to allow the statute to toll where the party in
alleged breach was not the defendant, but the third-party defendant. Id.
179. Yttro Corp. v. X-ray Mktg. Assn., 559 A.2d 3 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1989). While
in the initial portions of the litigation in Yttro, XMA received a letter from the University of
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applicable to the statute of limitations under § 2-312(3) actions. First,
the breach of a § 2-312(3) warranty occurs when the product delivery is
required by the contract; 180 therefore, under § 2-725 the statute begins to
run at that time. Second, a direct claim for infringement is not the only
method by which breach may be established.'8 ' The combination of
these two rulings, if followed by later courts, could be troublesome for
the buyer. Under the Yttro analysis, a buyer could purchase the goods,
possess them for a period beyond the relevant statute of limitations, be
sued for infringement, but yet be without remedy under § 2-312(3) even
though he did not learn that the wa'rranty was breached until after the
statute had run. The implications are that the buyer should either include
a clause within the contract which provides the buyer with some remedy
in the above situation or just be very careful about using goods that
could be the subject of a lawsuit for infringement.
82
There is no specific statute of limitations for Article 42 of the
Convention, but the limitations period set forth in Article 39 may apply
to goods that breach Article 42 which are "nonconforming.' '183 Article
39 states that the buyer loses the right to rely on the lack of conformity
if he does not notify the seller thereof within two years from when the
goods were tendered. 84 Article 39, however, provides an exception by
allowing for a different statute of limitations if the "time-limit is incon-
sistent with a contractual period of guarantee."'85 Therefore, depending
Virginia Patents Foundation (UVA) which demanded that XMA stop selling Yttro Corp.'s filters
in violation of UVA's patent. Id. at 3; see supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text; see also
supra note 160 and accompanying text. The letter also disclosed that UVA had sent a letter to
Yttro Corp. prior to delivery of goods, making a similar request. Yttro, 559 A.2d at 4. The court
addressed two claims Yttro Corp. made concerning when the breach occurred. First, the court
held that it was "satisfied that Yttro may not assert that its breach did not occur until the patent
infringement notice to the buyer. Section 2-312(3) provides specifically that the warranty against
infringement attaches at the time of delivery." Id. at 5 (citations ommitted). Further, the court
supported its ruling by quoting § 2-725(2) and stating that "Yttro's breach of warranty occurred
when its product delivery was required by the contract." Id. at 5-6. Second, the court held that
Yttro's assertion that the § 2-312(3) warranty can only be breached by a direct claim of
infringement to be "similarly meritless ... [and that the] mere casting of a substantial shadow
over [the buyers enjoyment of the seller's warranty against infringement], regardless of the
ultimate outcome, is sufficient to violate a warranty ... [against infringement]." d. at 6 (quoting
American Container Corp. v. Hanley Trucking, 268 A.2d 313, 318 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1970)). Finally, the court quoted Comment 3 to § 2-312(3) for the proposition that the buyer
does not have to be precluded from using the goods in order to breach the warranty against
infringement, but rather being prevented from using the goods "is merely one way of
establishing the fact of breach." Id.
180. Yttro, 559 A.2d at 5.
181. Id. at 6.
182. See discussion supra part I.D.4.
183. C.I.S.G., supra note 1, art. 39.
184. Id.
185. Id.
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upon a court's interpretation of Article 39, there may be a limitations
period of two years. But that period may be extended if the courts
determine it to be inconsistent with "a contractual period of
guarantee."
8 6
CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PRACTICING LAWYER
The purely domestic practitioner will be faced with situations in
contract drafting and, perhaps, in litigation where interpretation and
avoidance of the U.C.C. warranty will be important. More importantly,
being involved in today's increasingly global market, the domestic
practitioner should be aware of the implications involved in using the
warranty against infringement as stated within the convention. The
following discussion provides several points of concern to take into
account when making the choice to use either the U.C.C. or the Conven-
tion.
A. General Points
Several general points should be taken into account when deciding
how to draft the choice of law clause in an international contract, given
the differences between § 2-312(3) and Article 42. First, there is no case
law on Article 42, whereas, at least some authority exists on § 2-312(3).
If the practitioner represents a sophisticated party which would like
assurances that his actions will not breach the warranty, the practioner
should opt to use the U.C.C. Second, if the buyer obtains knowledge
that a third party may have an intellectual property right in the relevant
goods, the buyer should notify the seller of the claim and the nature of
it as soon as possible. Third, make sure you know where the businesses
are located for the purposes of each provision." 7 This is important
because it determines which law could apply. For example, if both
parties' places of business are in the United States but one of them
actually has his place of business in France, the Convention would apply
instead of the U.C.C. Fourth, make sure the subject matter is encom-
passed in either the Convention or the U.C.C. l'8 For example, if a client
sells software programs via modem, neither law may apply since the
software may not qualify as a good. Fifth, if the practioner decides to
use the Convention, he should specify in the contract which country's
law will be applied for times when the Convention does not address the
186. Id.
187. See id. art. 1.
188. See generally discussion supra parts I.A & I.B.
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issue at hand. 189 This should be done by stating where it has been con-
templated that the goods will be sold. If the parties have not con-
templated that the goods will be sold or otherwise used in a specific
country, that omission should be affirmatively noted. The contract
should then recite both: 1) the state where the buyer has his place of
business; and 2) that the law of that state will apply. Sixth, the parties
should specify in the contract what constitutes "infringement or like"
and/or "industrial property or other intellectual property," depending
upon which law will be in effect." This will avoid litigation of mar-
ginal subject matters. Finally and most importantly, specify any other
ambiguous standards, requirements, or provisions in the contract itself. 9'
For example, using the U.C.C. to specify what constitutes a "rightful
claim."
B. Representing the Seller
Representing the seller will cause several distinct concerns. First, as
there is an express provision in § 2-312(3) which allows the parties to
agree otherwise, and because there are at least two cases which support
this option, a practioner should specify in the agreement that the parties
agree to exclude any warranty against infringement.1 2 Beware, however,
because exclusion of the whole warranty against infringement would
also exclude the so called buyer's warranty. One may want to specifical-
ly include such provision in the contract if a client does a lot of busi-
ness based heavily upon the. buyer's specifications. Second, under the
Convention, if the seller knows of the right or claim and the nature of it,
the seller will not be able to rely upon lack of notice to deny the ex-
istence of the seller's obligation. 9 3 Third, where it is possible, the seller
should specify that claims for infringement of intellectual property rights
arising from the buyer's infringing use will not be valid claims under
either Article 42 or § 2-312(3).'94 Fourth, the seller may avoid this
warranty under the U.C.C. by specifying that the seller is not a merchant
regularly dealing in goods of the kind for the purposes of § 2-312(3).
This method should be used in combination with an express disclaimer
189. One should also designate a "fall back" jurisdiction so that if a problem arises
which is not covered by the Convention, the practioner will know which law applies.
190. See discussion supra part I.D.3.
191. In general, in order to avoid litigation, the contract should include as few am-
biguities as possible.
192. See discussion supra part I.D.
193. See C.I.S.G., supra note 1, art. 42.
194. See discussion supra parts II.A & II.B.
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of the warranty because the court will determine whether the seller is a
merchant regularly dealing in goods of the kind as a matter of law.
Fifth, if using the U.C.C., the seller should specify what constitutes a
"rightful claim."' 95 If both parties can agree on a definition, a lot of
potential confusion and litigation may be avoided. Sixth, if the seller is
selling a good which was produced in accordance with the specifications
of the buyer, the seller should specify this in the contract. This will
make it easier for the seller to assert a valid claim under the buyer's
warranty.
Fundamentally, the seller should try to disclaim any warranty
against infringement provision. If the seller must include such a
provision and has a choice between the Convention and the U.C.C., the
seller's counsel should choose the U.C.C. for the following reasons: (1)
the U.C.C. includes the buyer's warranty provision; (2) the possible
liabilities are more clearly established through available case law; (3) the
seller must be a merchant regularly dealing in goods of the kind; and (4)
the U.C.C. includes harsh notice provisions towards the buyer which
could possibly exclude the seller from liability. The only significant
problem with using the U.C.C. is that it may be difficult to determine
the definition of a "rightful claim."
Even though the seller is better off using the U.C.C., two points
make the Convention attractive: (1) the "knew or could not have been
unaware" standard of notice in the Convention is hard for the buyer to
satisfy; 9 6 and (2) the liability of seller under the Convention is limited
to those situations where he knew or could not have been unaware of
the right of claim.'97
C. Representing the Buyer
When representing the buyer, the practioner will want to make sure
that the client has the best possible remedies in case a third party has a
claim or right in the goods. First, take note of the points made under the
two aforementioned sections. Several will be very helpful. Second, make
sure that the seller is notified whenever it is suspected that a third party
may have a right or claim to the goods in question. 198 It is a recurring
theme that the buyer must keep the seller notified of all possible claims.
The more the buyer keeps the seller informed, the less chance the seller
195. See discussion supra part I.D.I.
196. See C.I.S.G., supra note 1, art. 42.
197. Id. art. 42(1).
198. See discussion supra part I.D.4.
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may avoid the warranty due to lack of notice. Second, if the buyer
furnishes anything which could be interpreted to be specifications to the
seller, the buyer should put a clause in the contract that attempts to: (1)
state that such specifications were not "specifications" for the purposes
of § 2-312(3); (2) that the seller did not rely thereon in producing said
goods; and (3) that the seller indemnifies the buyer for any liability
under § 2-312(3) which arises from seller following the buyer's
specifications. 19"
If given the choice between using the Convention or the U.C.C.,
buyer's counsel should clearly choose the Convention for the following
reasons: (1) the U.C.C. includes the buyer's warranty provision; (2)
under certain situations, the buyer may unilaterally reduce the amount
owed to the seller under the Convention; (3) there is no express dis-
claimer provision in Article 42 so the buyer may always argue that it
was not effectively disclaimed; and (4) the seller may not deny Article
42 liability based upon the buyer's failure to fulfill his notice obligations
under Article 43, if the seller knew of the right or claim at the time of
the conclusion of the contract. Pitfalls for the buyer in using the Con-
vention include: (1) ascertaining when the buyer ought to have been
aware of the right or claim; and (2) the notion that the seller's liability
for providing goods which are free from such rights or claims is con-
tingent upon proving that the seller knew or could not have been un-
aware of the right or claim at the time of the conclusion of the contract.
Both the U.CC. and the Convention generally provide that the seller
shall furnish goods which are free from claims or rights of third parties;
however, these laws provide almost as many questions as they do solu-
tions. International practitioners will have a choice of whether to apply
the Convention, the U.C.C., or neither. Those representing sellers
generally should try to disclaim the warranty against infringement or, if
that is not practical, to adopt the U.C.C. provision. Alternatively, those
practitioners who represent the buyer generally should choose the Con-
vention. Under either situation, practitioners should realize that making
an uninformed decision may result in grave consequences.
199. Meeting this recommendation may be hard in practice because of the mutual com-
promises inherent in negotiations.

